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Impairment in object identity but not object location memory following 
selective lesion to the left entorhinal cortex 
Abstract - 
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HIGHLIGHTS  
 We explored recognition memory in a patient with a left entorhinal cortex lesion 
 The patient was found to have a deficit in memory for object identity 
 The patient had spared object location memory 
 Recollection and familiarity for both object identity and location were generally 
normal 
 Results suggest that the entorhinal cortex is only involved in object identity  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A current issue within cognitive neuropsychological research concerns the role of the 
medial temporal lobes in both memory and perception. Mnemonic-perceptual theories have 
suggested that the medial temporal lobes are involved in perception as well as memory, with 
the perirhinal cortex responsible for object identity recognition and the hippocampus being 
interested in spatial perception (see Graham, Barense, & Lee, 2010; Lee, Barense, & Graham, 
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2005 for reviews). However, the role of the entorhinal cortex, which is situated between the 
hippocampus and perirhinal cortex, in both memory and perception remains little understood. 
This is due in part to the complete lack so far of patients with damage focal to the entorhinal 
cortex. The present research aims to shed light onto the role of the entorhinal cortex in these 
processes by exploring object memory and subjective experiences (recollection and familiarity 
processes) in a unique patient, MR, who has a selective lesion to her left entorhinal cortex. 
 
Regarding object memory, the two streams hypothesis proposes that different and 
distinct ‘what’ and ‘where’ pathways exist in the brain (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Mishkin, 
Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983). This influential theory asserts that visual information firstly 
enters the visual cortex before diverging into either a ventral visual ‘what’ pathway or a dorsal 
visual ‘where’ pathway. Part of these ‘what’ and ‘where’ streams ultimately reach the medial 
temporal lobes, where the information they contain is bound into a single, unified 
representation by the hippocampus (e.g. Diana, Yonelinas & Ranganath, 2007). Although these 
‘what’ and ‘where’ streams are initially perceptual, it is believed that they become endowed 
with mnemonic information as they enter the medial temporal lobes.  
 
With regards to the ‘what’ pathway, the perirhinal cortex is proposed to be the interface 
between memory and perceptual processes (e.g. Bussey & Saksida, 2007), where the perirhinal 
cortex is the ‘apex’ of the visual ventral processing stream and represents increasingly complex 
feature conjunctions of objects in a continuum (Bussey & Saksida, 2005). This assertion has 
been supported by fMRI research. For example, Barense, Henson, Lee, & Graham, (2010) 
found perirhinal cortex activity in neurologically intact participants who were presented with 
objects and faces when their viewpoint was changed between study and test phase. This 
suggests that this object identity process goes beyond perception as these representations 
appear to be abstract, suggesting that memory has a role in recalling the identity of these objects 
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as they would need to match them to stored representations. The evidence for the perirhinal 
cortex being concerned with object identity is therefore robust, and appears not to be a merely 
perceptual process as neurotypical participants are accurate in labelling objects when the 
viewpoint of the object is varied. Similarly, work on patients with perirhinal cortex damage has 
found corroborating results, finding that those with perirhinal cortex damage are impaired in 
objects (Barense, Gaffan, & Graham, 2007; Lee & Rudebeck, 2010). Neuroimaging on healthy 
adults has also supported this idea, for example (Lee, Bandelow, Schwarzbauer, Henson, & 
Graham, 2006) found that the right perirhinal cortex is sensitive to changes for object identity, 
but not for spatial changes (see also Erez, Cusack, Kendall, & Barense, 2015). 
 
The Where pathway is also thought to terminate, at least in part, in the medial temporal 
lobes. Specifically, mnemonic-perceptual theories have additionally recently been extended to 
the hippocampus, asserting that this structure also has both mnemonic and visual properties 
(Lee, Yeung, & Barense, 2012). Specifically, it is proposed that the hippocampus is responsible 
for processing the conjunctions of complex spatial features, just as the perirhinal cortex is 
concerned with the conjunctions of individual object features. Studies on patients with selective 
hippocampal damage have strongly supported this idea, finding that these patients display 
impaired object-location memory (e.g. Olson, Page, Moore, Chatterjee, & Verfaellie, 2006; 
Stepankova, Fenton, Pastalkova, Kalina, & Bohbot, 2004). Like the perirhinal cortex, the 
hippocampus is evidently also involved in both memory and spatial perception (Lee et al., 
2012).  
 
Given the location of the entorhinal cortex between the perirhinal cortex and the 
hippocampus, it has been speculated that this area may also be involved in perceptual-
mnemonic processes (Kent, Hvoslef-Eide, Saksida, & Bussey, 2016). Before moving onto 
evidence for its role in objects, it is worth mentioning that it has been purported that 
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subdivisions may exist within the entorhinal cortex, where the lateral part has a visuoperceptual 
role and the medial part has a visuospatial role (e.g. Reagh & Yassa, 2014; Schultz, Sommer, 
& Peters, 2012). Whilst animal studies certainly support this distinction (e.g. Hafting, Fyhn, 
Molden, Moser, & Moser, 2005; Kerr, Agster, Furtak, & Burwell, 2007; Killian, Jutras, & 
Buffalo, 2012; Yoganarasimha, Rao, & Knierim, 2011), caution should be exercised with these 
interpretations as there are marked species differences within the entorhinal cortex. For 
example, Strange, Witter, Lein, & Moser, (2014) demonstrate cross-species differences in 
hippocampal and entorhinal cortex anatomy, showing a marked difference in juxtaposition to 
the hippocampus and axes and so these lateral and medial areas in rats are located slightly 
differently to the same areas in primates. There is therefore an important caveat regarding 
extrapolating animal research to humans. Nevertheless, animal literature has been useful in 
exploring the entorhinal cortex as these models enabled the subdivisions within this area to be 
explored. For example, Kerr et al, (2007) identified that the lateral and medial entorhinal areas 
in the rat have differential connectivity, where the lateral part receives quite a lot of input from 
the amygdala and olfactory areas, whilst the medial part receives the majority of its input from 
the visual associations and the posterior parietal cortices (see also Canto, Wouterlood, & 
Witter, 2008). In support of this second suggestion, Killian, Jutras, & Buffalo, (2012) 
demonstrate the presence of grid cells in the entorhinal cortex in primates, a finding that has 
also been replicated in humans (Doeller, Barry, & Burgess, 2010; see also). In contrast, the 
lateral part of the entorhinal cortex is thought to be interested in nonspatial information as this 
area shows little spatial sensitivity in rats (e.g. Yoganarasimha, Rao, & Knierim, 2011). 
 
More appropriately, recent neuroimaging evidence has found supporting evidence of 
these entorhinal subdivisions in humans. For example, Reagh & Yassa (2014) scanned 
participants while they engaged in a ‘what’ and ‘where’ task for single objects. They found that 
the lateral entorhinal cortex was more robustly active during object discrimination compared 
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to spatial trials, and during target recognition. This finding therefore demonstrates that this area 
is involved in memory for object identity, rather than spatial configuration. The opposite was 
found for the medial entorhinal cortex, where this area was implicated in spatial memory 
compared to object identity recognition. Similarly, work using a 7 Tesla MRI scanner has found 
corroborating results. Navarro Schroder, Haak, Zaragoza Jimenez, Beckmann & Doeller 
(2015) scanned participants during a range of tasks, including one where participants were 
required to make animacy judgements for objects and scenes. They found higher activity in the 
posterior entorhinal cortex for spatial material and higher activity in the anterior entorhinal 
cortex for non-spatial stimuli (see also Maass, Berron, Libby, Ranganath, & Düzel, 2015).  
 
In addition, patient work has supported this idea; Fidalgo, Changoor, Page-Gould, Lee, 
& Barense (2016) explored object and scene recognition in older adults, finding that those who 
were at-risk for mild cognitive impairment performed worse in object recognition than scene 
recognition (see also Reagh et al., 2016). These studies suggest that the beginnings of cognitive 
decline may target the perirhinal and lateral entorhinal cortices first. Similarly, research into 
neurodegenerative diseases has provided insight into the contribution of the entorhinal cortex 
to memory. For example, Braak & Braak, (1992) implicated the entorhinal cortex in a number 
of different impairments, including Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s disease. DeToledo-Morrell et 
al., (2004) found that the hippocampal and entorhinal cortices volume (particularly the right 
entorhinal cortex) predicted the conversion rate of mild cognitive impairment to Alzheimer’s 
disease. Taken together, whilst the precise cytoarchitecture of the human entorhinal cortex 
remains to be clarified, there is at least emerging evidence that this area is involved in both the 
‘what’ and ‘where’ pathways in object recognition memory. Based on the limited animal and 
human research available, damage to the lateral part may therefore result in impaired object 
identity recognition whilst sparing object-location memory. Furthermore, it has been found that 
lateralisation occurs for object encoding. Bellgowan, Buffalo, Bodurka, & Martin, (2009) 
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found that object identity encoding was lateralised left, while spatial encoding was lateralised 
right within the medial temporal lobes (also see Kelley et al., 1998).  
 
Given the above, one of the key aims of the present research is to therefore investigate 
the role of the entorhinal cortex in both object location and object identity memory. There is 
substantial evidence garnered from both animals and humans that has suggested that the 
entorhinal cortex is involved in these processes. However, whilst these findings are 
encouraging, they would be further strengthened by supporting patient evidence. This 
relationship will be explored in patient MR who is unique in being the only patient so far 
discovered with a selective lesion to the left entorhinal cortex (Brandt, Eysenck, Nielsen, & 
von Oertzen, 2016). Furthermore, her cavernoma and its surrounding hemosiderin halo is 
specifically located in the lateral entorhinal cortex (see figure 1). Volumetric assessment 
showed no atrophy in the brain or mesiotemporal structures. Whilst there is the limitation that 
the volumetric assessment is without an intrascanner control group, Huppertz et al. (2010) have 
shown that inter-scanner variability had a coefficient of variation of up to 5% for 
mesiotemporal structures only. Therefore, there is strong evidence that MR’s cavernoma is 
specific to the lateral part of her left entorhinal cortex. It is thus expected that whilst MR should 
demonstrate impaired object identity encoding, she should perform normally in object location 
tasks. (Reagh & Yassa, 2014; Schultz et al., 2012). This key finding would be a substantial 
contribution to the field as it would support that functional subdivision within the human 
entorhinal cortex exists in humans, as well as in animal studies. This finding on a single-case 
study would also further substantiate recent findings on patients with memory impairment 
(Fidalgo et al., 2016; Reagh et al., 2016), which could have important clinical application. 
 
 A second key aim of the present research is to explore qualitative aspects of object 
memory retrieval. As well as having a role in perception, the medial temporal lobes also 
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underpin recognition memory and the subjective experiences which accompany successful 
retrieval, namely recollection and familiarity, or ‘remembering’ and ‘knowing’. Recollection 
involves the retrieval of contextual information (e.g. ‘I remember seeing the word ‘cat’ because 
it reminds me of my pet cat’) whereas familiarity is acontextual retrieval (‘I just know that I 
saw the word ‘cat’). There is dispute whether these processes are independent or not. According 
to single-process theorists (e.g. Dunn, 2008), recollection and familiarity reflect the strength of 
the underlying memory trace and so are the same process. Conversely, proponents of the dual-
process theory (e.g. Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Yonelinas, 2002) suggest that recollection and 
familiarity are separate and distinct. Furthermore, these two processes have a differing 
aetiology, with the hippocampus underpinning recollection and the perirhinal cortex supporting 
familiarity. As a reminder, ‘remembering’ and ‘knowing’ are interchangeable terms for 
‘recollection’ and ‘familiarity’, respectively. 
 
There is a wealth of behavioural evidence which indicates that recollection and 
knowing are independent processes, as they can be independently manipulated (Dewhurst & 
Hitch, 1997, 1999; Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Gregg & 
Gardiner, 1994; Mantyla & Raudsepp, 1996; Rajaram, 1993). Furthermore, neuroimaging 
evidence also supports this notion, as studies investigating event-related brain potentials 
(ERPs) have found that recollection and familiarity are associated with topographically 
differing ERP signatures (see Rugg & Curran, 2007, for a review). Additionally, fMRI 
evidence has demonstrated that the hippocampus underpins recollection, whereas the perirhinal 
cortex supports familiarity (Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Montaldi & Mayes, 2010; 
Staresina, Fell, Dunn, Axmacher, & Henson, 2013; Yonelinas, 2002). Finally, patient studies 
have also been invaluable in supporting the dual-process model in finding a clear double 
dissociation between remembering and knowing. For example, ‘Jon’, who has bilateral 
selective hippocampal damage, shows impaired recollection but spared familiarity (Brandt, 
 9 
 
Gardiner, Vargha-Khadem, Baddeley, & Mishkin, 2008). Conversely, NB, who underwent a 
left perirhinal cortex resection, shows the opposite pattern – she has impaired familiarity but 
normal recollection for verbal material (Bowles et al., 2007, 2010; Martin, Bowles, Mirsattari, 
& Köhler, 2011). These patient findings strengthen the concept that recollection and familiarity 
are distinct processes with differing neural substrates. However, whilst it is beyond the scope 
of the present article to discuss the dual vs. single debate fully, it is important to note that a 
single process theory instead proposes that recollection and familiarity are not independent and 
that the hippocampus supports both these processes (see the following for further arguments: 
Dunn, 2004; Knowlton & Squire, 1995; Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, Squire, et al., 2003; 
Squire, Wixted, & Clark, 2007). 
 
At present, there has been no specific role suggested for the entorhinal cortex in any 
theoretical recognition memory models, although recent research in healthy adults has 
suggested that this area has a selective role in familiarity rather than recollection-based 
judgements (e.g. de Vanssay-Maigne et al., 2011; Yonelinas et al., 2007). Until recently it has 
not been possible to directly examine the role of the entorhinal cortex in human recognition 
memory as a patient with such selective damage was not available to research. However, 
Brandt et al., (2016) report that patient MR, who has a selective lesion to her left entorhinal 
cortex, had impaired familiarity for words but performed normally in the recognition of non-
words and faces. Additionally, her recollection was unimpaired across these entire stimuli. 
Their research therefore provides the first patient evidence that the entorhinal cortex is involved 
in the process of familiarity but not recollection. This also fits in with the recent findings from 
Kafkas et al., (2016) who explored these processes in relation to material type in the medial 
temporal lobes. Of note, this study found that the rhinal cortices responded preferentially to 
object familiarity, but not to scenes or faces, whilst the hippocampus was not material-specific 
but did respond to recollection for all category types. This interesting study lends further 
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support to the idea that areas within the medial temporal lobes are involved in both memory 
and perception, and also that this can be material-specific. It also demonstrates further support 
that the entorhinal cortex is involved in object memory. 
 
The aims of the present research are therefore to investigate the role of the entorhinal 
cortex in object identity and object location, as well as to explore the qualitative memorial 
processes (i.e., recollection and familiarity) associated with these two types of recognition 
memory. This aim will be achieved by investigating these processes in patient MR and a set of 
matched controls. If the entorhinal cortex is selectively involved in object identity recognition, 
then one would expect MR to be significantly impaired in object identity recognition 
(Experiment 1) but to perform normally in object location recognition (Experiment 2) as this 
is thought to predominantly involve the right, not left, entorhinal cortex (Bellgowan et al., 
2009). In addition, if the entorhinal cortex selectively supports the familiarity but not the 
recollection process (Brandt et al., 2016), then one would expect that any impaired memory 
performance in MR be reflected in reduced familiarity but not recollection. 
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
The research gained ethical approval from the National Research Ethics Service and the 
University of Roehampton Ethics Committee prior to the start of the study. All participants 
including patient MR gave written informed consent and were informed they could withdraw 
their participation at any time without having to give a reason and without incurring any 
penalty. MR and eight controls took part in the present research (the same group were also used 
in Brandt et al, 2016). Control participants were healthy females, all of whom had fluent written 
and spoken English, and were additionally native English speakers. These controls were 
matched to MR on handedness, age, years of education (MR: 16, controls M = 14.86, SD = 
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2.48, mean is for the seven participants who were included in the experiment proper) and a 
range of neuropsychological intelligence profiling (National Adult Reading Test, Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, the Doors and Peoples Test and the Wechsler Memory 
Scale). All measures were tested using Crawford’s modified t-test, which is suitable for single 
case studies with a small control group (Crawford & Howell, 1998) and all p > .05 (see table 1 
for the full breakdown of their scores). Participants were given monetary compensation for 
their travel and participation.  
 
2.2 Clinical profile of MR and imaging analysis 
 MR is more fully described in Brandt et al., (2016). Briefly, she is a right handed female 
who was 51 years old at the time of testing. At the age of 36 she began to experience seizures, 
which presented in three different seizure types. Simple partial seizures tended to manifest with 
déjà-vu experiences only. Complex partial seizures began with deja-vu, followed by staring, 
lip smacking and unresponsiveness. Occasionally, complex partial seizures would propagate 
into secondary generalised tonic-clonic seizures. Following MRI investigations, a small 
cavernoma was identified on her left parahippocampal gyrus. To localise the lesion in relation 
to the entorhinal cortex, coronal images were compared with published references to the 
delineation of the entorhinal cortex (Insausti et al., 1998). As the cavernoma and its surrounding 
hemosiderin halo are best displayed in T2 sequences, coronal T2-weighted images with a slice 
thickness of 2 mm were used for the comparison. Furthermore, to exclude any atrophy of the 
mesial temporal structures automated volumetric assessment was performed according to 
previously described methods (Huppertz et al., 2010). Imaging analysis was only performed 
for MR and is shown in Figure 1 and volumetric analysis in table 2. This displays that the 
volumes of MR’s medial temporal lobes are in-line with aged-matched controls and, despite 
her cavernoma, there is no atrophy present in this area. Imaging analysis of MRs T2-weighted 
coronal MRI imaging localised the cavernoma in the left entorhinal cortex (figure 1). 
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Compared to delineation of mesial and lateral EC as proposed by Reagh & Yassa (2004), the 
cavernoma and its surrounding hemosiderin halo are located in the lateral EC. Volumes of 
whole brain and mesial temporal structures resulting from automated MRI volumetry are 
shown in table 2. Values were in the normal range and no difference in comparison of right 
and left mesiotemporal structures were found. This is in line with the pathology of cavernoma, 
which does not cause focal atrophy.  Ultimately, after trying out different drugs and dosages to 
manage her seizures, MR now takes 3000mg Levetiracetam per day, and has remained seizure-
free for several years now. 
 
2.3 Materials 
2.3.1. Experiment 1: object identity 
Participants were shown a total of 48 different 3D scenes adapted from Hollingworth, 
(2005). Each 3D scene was visually rich in colour, with shadows and lighting detail. All scenes 
depicted a real-life environment, e.g. a kitchen. For each scene, a target object was chosen (e.g. 
a kettle), which at test was then presented in isolation in the centre of the screen on an olive-
green background. Twenty-four of the scenes were true trials and 24 were false trials.  In half 
of the trials, this object was taken from the initial scene (true trial), and in the other half the 
object was not present in the initial scene (false trial) and was unsemantically-linked (e.g. a 
pumpkin object in a Christmas tree scene). The experiment was presented on E-Prime 2.0 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) and responses were collected using a keyboard. 
Prior to the start of the study, a practice block of four trials was given so that participants could 
familiarise themselves with the experimental procedure. The stimuli from this practice were 
taken from the SUN database (Xiao, Hays, Ehinger, & Torralba, 2010).  
 
2.3.2. Experiment 2: object location 
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This time, rather than the target object being presented in the centre of the screen, a true 
object’s location was manipulated. There were 24 true trials (the object is presented in the same 
location as it was in the initial scene) and 24 false trials (the object is moved to a false alarm 
position.) False alarm positions were calculated by working out the object’s centre x and y co-
ordinates and then subtracting these from the respective length and height of the scene in pixels. 
For example, an object with an original x,y location of 202 and 206 would become x = 598 and 
y = 374. Only objects that were shown in the scene were used in the test phase, rather than false 
objects. Importantly, it was only the location of the object that was manipulated in the present 
experiment, to ensure that this task was only exploring object-location memory. 
 
2.4. Procedure 
2.4.1. Experiment 1: object identity 
Participants gave written informed consent and were given a verbal description of the 
experiment. Then, they were trained on the remember/know/guess paradigm, using instructions 
closely modelled on Rajaram’s (1993). Firstly, this distinction was described to participants 
verbally, then they were asked to note whether a statement reflected a remember or know 
statement. This training sheet consisted of five remember and five know-type responses. When 
the researcher was happy that the participant could make an informed Remember-Know 
distinction (by scoring 100% on this training sheet) then the experiment proceeded. The sheet 
with the example phrases was left with the participant while they completed the experiment so 
they could refer to it if necessary. 
 
Firstly, a practice block using stimuli from the SUN database was given to participants 
so they could familiarise themselves with the demands of the experiment and to ensure they 
fully understood the method. Here, participants were shown a fixation cross for 1000ms before 
being shown a scene for 10 seconds, followed by a pattern mask of fractionated primary colours 
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for 200ms. Presentation of trials was randomised. Following this scene presentation, an object 
was then presented centrally on an olive-green background. In half of the trials, this object was 
taken from the initial scene (true trial), and in the other half the object was not present in the 
initial scene (false trial). Participants were asked ‘Was this object present in the scene?’, with 
a key press of ‘1’ indicated ‘yes’ and a key press of ‘2’ indicated ‘no.’ If they decided that the 
object was in the scene, they were then asked ‘Did you remember, know or guess your 
response?’ and asked to respond, where ‘1’ was a remember, ‘2’, was a know and ‘3’ was a 
guess response. If the participant initially indicated that the object was not in the scene, then 
the experiment skipped to the next trial. There were four of these practice trials in total and 
after finishing participants were given the opportunity to ask any questions before proceeding 
to the experiment proper. The actual experiment used the same method as the practice block, 
this time using 48 trials, where half were true and half were false. False trials used objects 
picked from Hollingworth (2005)’s own practice trials, which were not used in the present 
experiment. After the experiment was completed, participants were fully debriefed, thanked 
for their time, paid and dismissed. An illustration of a trial is shown in figure 2. 
 
2.4.2. Experiment 2: object location 
The procedure was almost identical to that of Experiment 1 and took place on average 
almost 4 weeks after Experiment 1. Participants were again given a verbal description of the 
experiment before being re-trained on types of remember and know decisions. The same 
practice block was given as in Experiment 1, although this time an object’s location was 
manipulated, as described in the Materials subsection. Importantly, the identity of the target 
was not changed in this experiment, only its location, to ensure that this experiment was only 
exploring object-location memory. There were four of these practice trials in total and after 
finishing participants were given the opportunity to ask any questions before proceeding to the 
experiment proper. The actual experiment used the same method as the practice block, this 
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time using 48 trials, where again half the trials were true. After the experiment was completed, 
participants were fully debriefed, thanked for their time, paid and dismissed. An illustration of 
a trial is shown in figure 3. 
 
2.5. Pilots 
 A first pilot, using the same stimuli as described above, study using eight healthy young 
adults was conducted using semantically-related objects as distractors to determine whether 
these would be suitable as false trials in the main experiment. For example, within a Christmas 
scene, the target object of a square gift wrapped in white wrapping paper with a red bow would 
result in a distractor object of a rectangle gift wrapped in purple wrapping paper with a green 
bow. However, the results of the pilot found that this young adult pilot group struggled with 
the task with an overall accuracy rate of only 39%. As patient MR is substantially older than 
those in the pilot group, she would have no doubt performed at floor level using these lure 
objects as false trials. The decision therefore was taken to use semantically-unrelated 
distractors instead, such as a pumpkin for a Christmas scene. However, in the experiment 
proper, three trials were excluded from the What experiment as these used false alarm objects 
that were semantically congruent. Importantly, inspection of these found that MR correctly 
rejected these, suggesting that she was engaging memorial processes rather than using any 
strategy or discrimination.  Additionally, to ensure the object identity and object location tasks 
were matched as closely as possible, distractor locations were used for false trials in the object 
location task (see section 2.4.2). Distractor positions were created to be a sufficient distance 
from the target object such that the location of the distractor would be spatially-unrelated to 
the target. For example, an object in the bottom left of a scene would be presented at the top 
right at test (see figure 3). 
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Given the nature of single case studies, a within-subjects design was a necessity in the 
present research. To explore any potential practice effects that could affect the object identity 
and object location experiments, a second pilot study was conducted on 25 neurotypical adults 
using a within-subjects design and which counterbalanced the administration of these two tasks 
to see if any order effects existed. Paired t-tests with a Bonferroni correction (α = p / 5 = .01) 
found that participants performed better in the ‘What’ experiment (M = .89) if they completed 
the ‘Where’ experiment first (M = .66) [t(12) = -6.17, p < .001). Similarly, generally 
participants were better at the What (M = .82) than Where (M = .68), [t(24) = 3.09, p < .01]. 
Therefore, the decision was made to use a constant order on MR and her control group, giving 
all participants then What experiment and then the Where so that their performance in the later 
object-location task would not be at any disadvantage. This complements findings from Babb 
& Johnson (2014) who found that participants are slightly more accurate in a ‘What’ compared 
to ‘Where’ experiment.  Furthermore, in the pilot, the break between the two tasks was 
approximately 10 minutes and they were conducted in the same one hour session. This break 
was extended to almost four weeks in the experiment proper to further ensure no contamination 
of practice or ceiling effects.  
 
3. Results 
 
One participant was excluded from both experiments for floor performance. Results 
from the two experiments were analysed using the proportion of hits minus false alarms for 
overall recognition, remember, know and guess responses (see Table 3 for all hits and false 
alarms, and table 4 for an individual breakdown). In line with other similar patient research 
(e.g. Bowles et al., 2007), remember responses were taken to reflect recollection, while a 
correction of independence was applied to know responses [F = K(1-R)] in order to get an 
estimate of familiarity (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). This correction of independence assumes 
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that recollection and familiarity are distinct, where recollection is proposed to be a categorical 
threshold process, while familiarity is a continuous signal-detection process (Yonelinas & 
Jacoby, 2012). These data were also analysed without the correction of independence (hits 
minus false alarms). All results were analysed using Crawford’s modified t-test (Crawford & 
Howell, 1998).  
  
3.1. Experiment 1: object identity 
 Three trials were excluded from the analysis as the objects chosen may have been 
semantically linked to their respective scene, for example, a living room scene which contained 
a lamp had a different lamp shown as the false alarm object, which could therefore have raised 
the false alarm rate. All analyses are two-tailed unless otherwise stated.  
 
 The analysis on overall recognition performance (hits-false alarms) found that MR was 
significantly impaired in comparison to controls (MR = .62, controls = .84, t(6) = -4.12, p < 
.05, one-tailed) (see figure 4). Additionally, analysing overall recognition memory using d’, 
based on signal detection theory (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), showed that MR was also 
impaired when compared to controls (t(6) = -3.11, p < .05). MR’s response criterion was 
measured using the criterion location measure (C) (as in Martin et al., 2011), which revealed 
that MR had no shift in response criterion when compared to controls (t(6) = 1.03, p > .05). 
Further analyses revealed no significant differences in recollection (MR = .58, controls = .63, 
t(6) = -.29, p > .05), nor in familiarity, (MR = .10, controls = .30, t(6) = -.75, p > .05, one-
tailed), nor in know responses where the correction of independence was removed (MR = .04, 
controls = .13, t(6) = -.56, p > .05, one-tailed), or guess responses (MR = 0, controls = .08) 
[t(6) = -1.50, p > .05, two-tailed].  
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Given MR’s impairment in overall recognition performance, separate analyses on hits 
and false alarms were carried out in order to determine where the nature of her impairment was 
located. These analyses found that in terms of hits, MR was impaired in overall recognition 
(MR = .67, controls = .86, t(6) = -2.96, p < .05) but performed within normal range for 
recollection (MR = .63, controls = .64, t(6) = -.06, p > .05), familiarity (MR = .11, controls = 
.30, t(6) = -.71, p > .05, one-tailed) and know responses, where the correction for independence 
was removed (MR = .04, controls = .13, t(6) = -.56, p > .05, one-tailed), and finally nor for 
guess responses (MR = 0, controls = .10) [t(6) = -1.56, p > .05]. The analyses on overall false 
alarms showed no differences between MR and the controls (MR = .05, controls = .02, t(6) = 
.94, p > .05), nor were any differences found for recollection (MR = .05, controls = .01, t(6) = 
1.87, p > .05), and neither group made any false know responses, hence familiarity rates are 
not calculated. Finally, guess responses were also normal for MR (MR = 0, controls = .01) [t(6) 
= -.47, p > .05]. 
 
3.2. Experiment 2: object location 
One trial was excluded from analysis as the location of the object coincided where a 
similar object was in the original scene. Analysis was the same as described in Experiment 1. 
The results revealed that there were no significant differences between MR and the controls for 
overall recognition memory, (MR = .70, controls = .69, t(6) = .06, p > .05) (see figure 5). Her 
d’ score was also normal in this task when compared to controls (t(6) = -.30, p > .05), as was 
her C score (t(6) = -1.09, p > .05). However, MR had significantly lower recollection compared 
to controls, (MR = .33, controls = .52, t(6) = -2.54, p < .05). There were no significant 
difference between MR and the controls for the measure of familiarity (MR = .43, controls = 
.25, t(6) = .77, p > .05), nor for uncorrected know responses (MR = .29, controls = .12, t(6) = 
1.45, p > .05), nor guess responses (MR = .08, controls = .06), t(6) =.31, p > .05.  
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Given MR’s impairment for overall remember responses, separate analyses on hits and 
false alarms were carried out in order to explore this further. For hits, the analysis found that 
MR was within normal range for remember responses (MR = .42, controls = .54, t(6) = -1.40, 
p > .05) as well as correct know responses, (MR = .29, controls = .15, t(6) = 1.87, p > .05), also 
familiarity (MR = .50, controls = .33, t(6) = 1.14, p > .05) and guess responses (MR = .13, 
controls = .08), t(6) =.59, p > .05). Analysis of false alarms found that MR’s overall scores 
were normal (MR = .13, controls = .07, t(6) = .80, p > .05). However, the analysis revealed that 
MR gave significantly more false remember responses (MR = .09, controls = .02), t(6) = 3.27, 
p < .05) but had normal levels of false know responses (MR = 0, controls = .03), t(6) = -.56, p 
> .05), also familiarity (MR = 0, controls = .03, t(6) = -.56, p > .05) and guess responses (MR 
= .04, controls = .02, t(6) = .62, p > .05).  
3.3 Comparison between object identity versus object location tasks 
 Task performance between MR and controls was compared to see if there were any 
differences in the object identity and object location task. This was done as pilot testing found 
that participants had better recognition accuracy in the object identity task when compared to 
the object location task.  
 
 Difference scores were calculated by subtracting scores in the object location task from 
those in the object identity task as the latter was found to be an easier task during pilot testing. 
Inspection of these scores found that, for recognition accuracy, whilst the controls had a 
positive score (M = .15), MR had a negative score (MR = -.08). This indicated that the controls 
had better performance on the object identity task compared to the object location, while the 
opposite was found for MR. MR’s scores were compared to controls using Crawford’s 
modified t-test, finding that her difference score in recognition accuracy was lower (t(6) = -
1.96, p < .05), and that she also had a significantly lower difference score in hits (t(6) = -3.16, 
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p < .05). These findings further support the notion that MR found the object location task easier 
and the object identity task harder. 
 
4. Discussion 
The aim of the present research was to explore the role of the left entorhinal cortex in 
object recognition. The crucial findings demonstrated that MR was impaired in recognising an 
object’s identity, but not recognising an object’s location. The remaining results found that MR 
generally performed similarly to the controls in terms of recollection and familiarity, although 
she did report significantly more false remember responses in the Where experiment. The 
findings of the present research are of major theoretical importance as they indicate that the 
‘what’ pathway may therefore extend as far as the entorhinal cortex. This finding on a single-
case study therefore strengthens the mounting animal and human literature which both suggests 
that subdivisions exist within the entorhinal cortex and that the lateral part is involved in object 
identity, but not object location recognition (e.g. Reagh & Yassa, 2014). 
 
The current research found that MR is impaired in recognising an object’s identity, but 
not its location. Previous research has posited that the perirhinal cortex underpins object 
perception, whereas the hippocampus underpins spatial perception (e.g. Graham et al., 2010; 
Lee, Barense, et al., 2005). As far as the authors are aware, no such perceptual-mnemonic 
theory has yet formally suggested a role of the entorhinal cortex in object processing, although 
there is existing neuroimaging evidence on healthy participants suggesting that it does have a 
role to play in object processing (see Bellgowan et al., 2009). More recent work using a higher 
strength scanner has also broadly supported this notion, although the precise nature of the 
human entorhinal cortex has yet to be fully understood (Maass et al., 2015; Navarro Schröder 
et al., 2015). Lastly, research has found that object identity and object location processing is 
lateralised to the left and right hemispheres, respectively (Bellgowan et al., 2009). Taken 
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together, these findings on healthy participants strongly suggest that the entorhinal cortex has 
a role in object perception. Hence, the present patient research strengthens this notion, finding 
that the left entorhinal cortex is at least involved in processing object identity. The extant 
finding therefore implicates the entorhinal cortex as being part of the ‘what’ pathway, thus 
extending research on patients with perirhinal cortex damage who have been found to be 
impaired in recognising an object’s identity. Furthermore, these findings support the literature 
that has identified these subdivisions; as discussed, there is growing evidence that the 
entorhinal cortex consists of at least medial and lateral subdivisions in humans and that these 
have differing roles (see Schultz et al., 2015, for a review). On the basis of animal research that 
has suggested that the medial part of this area is involved in spatial processing (e.g. Kerr et al., 
2007) and the lateral is involved in nonspatial processing (e.g. Yoganarasimha et al., 2011), it 
was predicted that MR would be more likely to demonstrate an impairment in the What but not 
the Where experiment. This prediction was supported in the present research, consistent with 
her cavernoma exclusively covering her lateral, but not medial, left entorhinal cortex. 
Furthermore, this result is further supported by the finding that MR has no atrophy within this 
area and indeed that there are no volumetric differences within  her medial temporal lobe 
regions to age-matched controls. Therefore, her impairment can be confidently deduced to the 
cavernoma on the lateral part of her left entorhinal cortex, which strongly suggests that this 
area is complicit for object identity recognition. 
 
Importantly, the above findings demonstrate that MR’s impairment is not solely based 
on incorrect recognition as previously shown (Brandt et al., 2016), but can also manifest itself 
as reduced correct recognition for familiar non-verbal material. However, this is in direct 
contrast to the normal performance for non-verbal material MR revealed previously. Brandt et 
al., (2016) found that MR had normal face recognition, regardless of whether the faces were 
familiar (i.e. celebrities) or unfamiliar. However, faces and objects, whilst both being non-
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verbal stimuli, are arguably quite different in terms of processing (e.g. Duchaine & Nakayama, 
2005; Tanaka & Farah, 1993), in that verbal labels may not be as readily available for famous 
faces as they are for common everyday objects. For example, in the context of faces, one is 
more likely to name and encounter a personal friend or colleague  more often than a famous 
face (Brédart, Brennen, Delchambre, McNeill, & Burton, 2005). Additionally, object naming 
can be made on the basis of its ‘common’ name, whereas face labelling requires its ‘proper 
name’ (Moore & Valentine, 1998). One is more likely to come across a chair than Liza 
Minnelli, and so the verbal label of ‘chair’ may naturally be more readily available upon 
presentation of the item. It has long been established that naming objects is faster for high-
frequency (e.g. chair) than low-frequency (e.g. syringe) items (Oldfield & Wingfield, 1965). 
As the likelihood of encountering/viewing a famous face in day-to-day life is arguably less 
likely than that of an everyday object, this frequential difference may account for MR’s 
discrepancy in normal face but impaired object identity recognition. Furthermore, this verbal 
labelling appears to be lateralised to the left hemisphere (e.g. Acres et al, 2009; Golby et al., 
2001; Kelley et al., 1998). Even learning new names for unfamiliar objects has found to be left-
sided, albeit not for all participants (Cornelissen et al, 2004). Chiefly, these discrepancies in 
findings suggest that MR’s non-verbal memory can no longer be assumed to be wholly 
unimpaired and warrants further investigation. 
 
 
 
The present research additionally found that MR had normal correct object-location 
memory, although it was found that MR displayed significantly more false remember responses 
than controls in the object location experiment, and although these proportions were very low 
(MR = .09, controls = .02), they do represent almost a five-fold increase. This is a curious 
finding and it is not clear why MR reported enhanced false remember responses in this 
experiment. On the face of it, it is unlikely that she made an error in typifying a response as 
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she is well-practiced in research using the remember/know paradigm and has been trained on 
these types of responses. In addition patient VL exhibits severe erroneous recollection which 
may be due to a binding error because of her extensive medial temporal lobe damage (Craik et 
al., 2014). Whilst MR’s damage is nowhere as extensive or her memory impairment as severe 
as VLs, it is possible that given the object-location experiment may involve both the 
hippocampus and entorhinal cortex, the demands on these areas may have given rise to these 
erroneous recollection experiences as the item information does not get projected through into 
the hippocampus properly and thus bound. However, this is pure speculation and with 
behavioural results alone, it is impossible to be definitive. 
 
However, this explanation is not consistent with the present finding of impaired object 
identity but not location recognition which was most probably due to the verbal labelling 
associated with the former process (e.g. Oldfield & Wingfield, 1965). Specifically, the issue is 
why would MR demonstrate an overall impairment in object identity that does not further 
manifest itself in an impaired familiarity process for these items? A tentative explanation is 
that the verbal demands induced by the present stimuli may not have been strong enough to 
reveal any deficit in familiarity. That is, a strongly verbal task such as in the word recognition 
study by Brandt et al (2016) elicits MR’s selective impairment in familiarity, however a non-
verbal task with only a weak verbal component such as the present object identity study does 
not. In order to elucidate whether this is in fact the case, future research should consider 
manipulating the verbal strength within a non-verbal task such as instructing participants to 
name the objects out-loud, or having the object name presented alongside the object image for 
participants to read. This extra verbal demand may then lead to MR showing an impairment in 
both overall recognition and familiarity in object identity recognition, as it would sufficiently 
tax her left entorhinal cortex. In addition, the use of completely novel objects in an object 
identity task would remove all possibility of verbal labelling, thereby minimising left 
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hemisphere involvement, and may well therefore lead to MR showing no impairment in overall 
recognition memory such as found in the present research. Further neuroimaging work on MR 
should then establish if these speculations are supported by exploring MR’s brain activity 
during object recognition memory tasks that purposefully and differentially stress verbal and 
non-verbal processing.  
 
 One of the key findings in the present research is the compelling evidence that the 
entorhinal cortex is integral to object identity recognition. Moreover, it is the first single case 
study on a patient with a selective lesion to the left entorhinal cortex that has explored object 
recognition memory. Such populations offer obvious localisation of function advantages in 
memory research, although caution must be taken not to over-interpret the present findings, as 
further investigation is required. For example, it would be interesting to see how patient NB 
would perform on these same object memory tasks. If it is the case that MR’s deficit lies in 
verbal labelling, as hypothesised, then NB may also show this impairment in object identity 
recognition. Recent research found that NB has an impairment in cumulative lifetime 
familiarity for object concepts with a high feature-overlap (Bowles, Duke, Rosenbaum, McRae, 
& Köhler, 2016). While object identity recognition was not researched, NB’s impairment 
persisted even when pictures were offered as an additional cue to the verbal object labels during 
testing, suggesting a role of the left perirhinal system in familiarity-judgements for objects. 
Similarly, it would also be of interest to see how a patient with a lesion to their right entorhinal 
cortex might perform in these object memory tasks, as this would shed light on whether the 
crux of MR’s object identity impairment is due to verbal labelling processes that are left-
dominant. A patient with such damage may therefore be unimpaired as MR’s performance 
suggests that object recognition is resolved by the left, and not the right, hemisphere. Although 
to the author’s knowledge no patient like MR currently exists in the literature, further studies 
on patients with rhinal cortex damage would be valuable to clarify the role of the entorhinal 
 25 
 
cortex in object recognition memory. In addition, the present findings found that MR was 
impaired in object identity recognition, but only in comparison to her small, albeit closely age-
matched control group. Broadly, there needs to be a consensus on the role of the entorhinal 
cortex with respect to object memory and subjective experience (also see Price & Friston, 2002, 
for an interesting discussion concerning these issues in imaging neuropsychological patients), 
as the role of the entorhinal cortex in memory and perception is relatively little-researched in 
comparison to other medial temporal lobe structures. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In sum, the present research has demonstrated for the first time a unique relationship 
between the entorhinal cortex and object identity but not object location memory. Furthermore, 
given the generally normal correct recollection and familiarity levels demonstrated in patient 
MR, our results suggest that the role the entorhinal cortex has to play in object identity 
recognition is based mainly on quantitative aspects of recognition memory. Furthermore, this 
appears to be restricted to the lateral part of the left entorhinal cortex. These findings suggest a 
theoretical re-think of the role of the entorhinal cortex in mnemonic-perceptual accounts of the 
medial temporal lobes. 
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Table 1. 
MR and Control’s scores as a function of neuropsychological test (see also Brandt et al, 
2016). 
 MR 8 Controls 7 Controls 
NART 103 107.13 (2.36) 107.43 (2.37) 
WASI 114 100.88 (10.49) 104.00 (6.11) 
Doors and People 10 10.25 (4.30) 11.43 (2.94) 
WMS:    
General 96 102.00 (14.90) 106.57 (8.00) 
Auditory immediate 94 98.50 (16.34) 102.43 (12.95) 
Visual immediate 115 102.75 (15.59) 107.71 (7.32) 
Memory immediate 105 98.50 (18.21) 103.57 (12.11) 
Auditory delayed 92 100.00 (12.47) 103.29 (8.98) 
Visual delayed 109 101.38 (12.61) 105.14 (7.29) 
Auditory recognition delayed 96 104.38 (21.78) 109.29 (18.13) 
Working memory 105 97.75 (14.83) 101.14 (12.21) 
 
 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2. Results of automated volumetric MRI analysis. All volumetric results have been 
standardised to an intracranial volume (ICV) of 1400 mL. 
  
Name MR Age-matched 
Controls (Mean) 
Age-matched 
Controls (SD) 
z scores 
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Brain 1117.0 1109.5 44.4 0.2 
Brain R 560.4 558.7 22.5 0.1 
Brain L 556.6 550.8 22.3 0.3 
Hippocampus R 3.3 3.4 0.3 -0.4 
Hippocampus L 3.2 3.3 0.3 -0.5 
Amygdala R 1.9 1.9 0.2 0.0 
Amygdala L 1.7 1.8 0.1 -0.4 
Parahippocampal gyrus R 5.0 5.1 0.5 -0.2 
Parahippocampal gyrus L 4.5 4.6 0.4 -0.3 
Entorhinal area R 1.7 1.7 0.2 0.0 
Entorhinal area L 1.7 1.7 0.2 0.1 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  
Proportion of hits and false alarms for MR and controls as a function of experiment type. 
 
 Hits  False alarms 
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 Remember Know Guess  Remember Know Guess 
Exp. 1: 
Object 
Identity 
       
MR .63 .04 0  .05 0 0 
Controls .64 (.16) .13 (.15) .10 (.06)  .01 (.02) 0 (0) .01 (.02) 
        
Exp. 2: 
Object 
Location 
       
MR .42 .29 .13  .09 0 .04 
Controls .54 (.08) .15 (.07) .08 (.08)  .02 (.02) .03 (.05) .02 (.03) 
 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 4. 
A breakdown of MR and Control’s individual scores. 
Experiment 1: Object identity     2: Object location    
  Hits  False alarms    Hits  False alarms 
 Remember Know Guess Remember Know Guess  Remember Know Guess Remember Know Guess 
MR .63 .04 0 .05 0 0  .42 .29 .13 .09 0 .04 
P1 .29 .42 .13 0 0 .05  .46 .08 .04 .04 .13 0 
P2 .63 .13 .17 0 0 .05  .63 .17 .08 .04 0 0 
P3 .75 .04 0 0 0 0  .58 .08 .04 .04 .04 .04 
P4 .71 .04 .13 0 0 0  .46 .17 .25 0 0 .09 
P5 .67 0 .13 0 0 0  .50 .21 0 0 0 0 
P6 .79 .04 .08 .05 0 .05  .67 .08 .08 .04 .04 0 
P7 .63 .25 .04 0 0 0  .50 .25 .04 0 0 0 
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Figure 1. T2-weighted coronal imaging of MRs cavernoma (white arrow, EC = entorhinal 
cortex; CS = collateral sulcus). Orientation of the coronal images is perpendicular to the 
longitudinal axis of the hippocampus and slice thickness is 2 mm. Following the protocol of 
Insausti et al (1998), this series of images shows the landmarks used to identify the 
hippocampal and rhinal cortical areas. Here, EC is as denoted between arrowheads. It would 
appear that MR’s cavernoma and its surrounding hemosiderin halo (surrounding susceptibility 
artefact = black) covers the lateral part of the left entorhinal cortex according to Reagh & Yassa 
(2004).  
 
 
Figure 2. An illustration of a typical true trial in the object identity experiment.  
  
Figure 3. An illustration of a typical true trial in the object location experiment. 
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Figure 4. Recognition accuracy and associated overall subjective experiences for MR and 
controls in the What experiment. * indicates p < .05 between MR and Controls on this 
measure. 
Figure 5. Recognition accuracy and associated overall subjective experiences for MR and 
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controls in the Where experiment. * indicates p < .05 between MR and Controls on this 
measure. 
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